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I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things
which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional
operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible
worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation
plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus condi-
tional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure
for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are
around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus counterfactual condi-
tionals, the closest worlds are relevantly closest belief-worlds: closest to
how things are believed to be, rather than to how they are. Also, closeness
takes into account apriority and the opacity of intentional contexts.
I
Conceivability and Possibility. I believe that we can conceive and
represent to ourselves the impossible. By ‘impossible’ I mean what
obtains at no possible world, not just, for example, what is incom-
patible with the actual laws of nature. After Kripke, such absolute
impossibility is often called ‘metaphysical’: the impossibility that
water be xyz, for instance. But I will allow logical and mathemati-
cal impossibilities to join the club, as most philosophers think that
‘2+2=4’ or ‘If it snows then it snows’ fail at no possible world.
I take absolute modalities as objective, non-conceptual features of
reality, irreducible to human conventions and mental undertakings.
On the other hand ‘conceiving’ or ‘representing’ stand precisely for
mental undertakings. I use the words as generics for a range of in-
tentional activities involving the depiction of scenarios, situations or
circumstances, and recorded in ordinary language by expressions
like imagining, mentally visualizing, picturing, envisaging. I leave
their serious investigation qua psychological events to cognitive sci-
entists. We may just focus on what Yablo (1993) and, especially,
Chalmers (2002) characterize as positive conceivability. When we
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we have something like a mental scenario verifying A. We represent
to ourselves a setting, a configuration of objects and properties (not
perforce visually imaginable, for instance, if the involved objects are
abstract), correctly described by A. This kind of conceivability typi-
cally features in thought experiments, for example, zombie argu-
ments in the philosophy of mind.
Some forms of conceivability may be a useful heuristic, providing
prima facie evidence of possibility. But though I will not defend this
claim here, I do not believe in the stronger thesis that conceivability,
as roughly characterized above, automatically entails possibility—
that we are prevented from peeking at absolute impossibilities.1 The
question for this paper is rather, assuming we can conceive the im-
possible, how are we to understand and model the fact? I reply: via
modal sentential operators, understood as restricted quantifiers on
worlds. The operators will be hyperintensional (unsurprisingly: they
model states of the mind) because the set of worlds one quantifies
over in their semantics is a larger totality than the set of possible
worlds. It includes (absolutely) impossible worlds: ways things could
not be, worlds which represent absolute impossibilities as obtaining
(see Berto 2009 for an introduction, Berto 2012 for an application to
Meinongianism and the philosophy of fiction).
§ii introduces some simple semantic machinery and an initial
‘naive conceivability’ operator, some virtues of which are described
in §iii. §iv highlights a problem with the naive operator, exposes a
solution proposed in the literature, and finds it insufficient. Then a
hopefully more satisfactory view is drafted. §v introduces ceteris
paribus conceivability operators interpreted as variably restricted
world quantifiers: many worlds complying with the explicitly repre-
sented content are ruled out by considerations of (relevant, context-
dependent) similarity or closeness. §§vi and vii explore how close-
ness works in the presence of impossible worlds. Unlike with ordi-
nary counterfactuals, in ceteris paribus conceivability (what Lewis
called) weak centring fails, for the selected worlds are closest to be-
lieved actuality rather than to actuality. Apriority and the opacity of
intentional contexts also play a role in determining closeness.
1 I think that attempts to rule out counterexamples via Kripkean redescriptions (‘You think
you can conceive of water not being h2o, but you actually conceive of watery stuff not
being h2o’), don’t work, for example, with first-person thoughts and mathematical impos-
sibilities (see Wright 2002).
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Formalities and Naive ®. Let L be a sentential language with varia-
bles p, q, r(p1, p2, …, pn), negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction∨, the conditional t, the standard alethic modals  and , a una-
ry sentential operator ®, and parentheses. Sentential variables are
atomic formulae. If A and B are formulae, so are ¬A, A∧B, A∨B,
A t B, A, A, and ®A; outermost brackets are normally omit-
ted. The only piece of novelty with respect to a normal modal sen-
tential language is ®, which I will call the naive representation
operator. ‘®A’ is to be read as ‘It is represented that A’, or ‘It is con-
ceived that A’.2
An interpretation for L is a sextuple 	P, I, E, @, R, Ç
. P is the set
of possible worlds. I and E are two kinds of impossible worlds, the
intensionally and extensionally impossible (what this distinction
comes to, we will see). P, I and E are disjoint. W=P ∪ I ∪ E is the
totality of worlds simpliciter. @∈P is the actual world. R⊆W×W.
If 	w1, w2
∈R(w1, w2∈W), we write ‘w1Rw2’ and claim that w2 is
representationally accessible (R-accessible) from w1. Ç is a pair 	Ç+,Ç−
 of relations between worlds and formulae: ‘w Ç+A’ means that
A is true at world w, ‘w Ç−A’ means that it is false there. The recur-
sive truth conditions are as follows. The extensional vocabulary
works thus for all w∈P ∪ I (‘iff’ stands for ‘if and only if’):
w Ç+¬A iff w Ç−A
w Ç−¬A iff w Ç+A
w Ç+A∧B iff w Ç+A and w Ç+A
w Ç−A∧B iff w Ç−A or w Ç−B
w Ç+A∨B iff w Ç+A or w Ç+B
w Ç−A∨B iff w Ç−A and w Ç−B
As for the modals, for all w∈P:
2 Intentional operators are often indexed to agents: in the usual notation of epistemic logics,
‘KxA’ is to mean that cognitive agent x knows/believes that A. Since the agent subscript
would not have done much work for our purposes, being just carried around as a parame-
ter, I have omitted it.
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w Ç−A iff for some w1∈P, w1Ç−A
w Ç+A iff for some w1∈P, w1Ç+A
w Ç−A iff for all w1∈P, w1Ç−A
The world quantifiers in these clauses are restricted to items in P:
unrestricted necessity or possibility is truth at all or some possible
world(s) (the standard modalities will not do much work: they are
there mainly to be compared with ®). We have a strict conditional.
For all w∈P:
w Ç+A t B iff for all w1∈P, if w1Ç+A then w1Ç+B
w Ç−A t B iff for some w1∈P, w1Ç+A and w1Ç−B
Truth and falsity conditions are given separately: as we want to
model conceivable inconsistencies, we allow some formulae to be
both true and false, ‘glutty’, at some worlds (and also, neither true
nor false, ‘gappy’). We may not want this to happen at possible
worlds, however. Then we may impose a Classicality Condition on
them:
(cc) If w∈P, then for each variable p, either w Ç+p or w Ç−p,
but not both.
An easy induction shows that the condition generalizes to all formu-
lae: no gaps or gluts at possible worlds. Things get more interesting
at impossible worlds. At points in I, formulae of the form A t B,
A and A are treated as atomic: truth-values are assigned to them
directly, non-recursively, in an arbitrary way. At points in E, all
complex formulae are treated as atomic and behave arbitrarily: a
disjunction may be true there even though both disjuncts are false,
etc. Hence the names: at intensionally impossible worlds, only the
intensional operators (the conditional and modals) are anarchic; at
the extensionally impossible ones, also the extensional vocabulary
can be. Extensionally impossible worlds can fail to be closed under
any non-trivial consequence relation, but they are accessible via R.
For w∈P:
w Ç+®A iff for all w1∈W such that wRw1, w1Ç+A
w Ç−®A iff for some w1∈W such that wRw1, w1Ç−A3
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they are conceived or represented to be at w. It is conceived or repre-
sented that A (at w), just in case A is true at all w1 that comply with
the representation. Let ®A be my dreaming that I win the lottery;
then an R-accessible w1 is a fine world at which my dream comes 
true. The operator works similarly to an ordinary restricted quanti-
fier on worlds. The difference is only in the broader class of accessi-
ble worlds. Logical consequence is straightforward. If Σ is a set of 
formulae:
Σ Ñ A iff, for every interpretation 	P, I, E, @, R, Ç
 if @Ç+B
for all B∈Σ, then @Ç+A)
Logical consequence is truth preservation at the base world @ in all
interpretations (logical validity is truth at @ in all interpretations:
Ñ A iff ∅ Ñ A). We may as well define consequence as truth preser-
vation at all possible worlds: @ is not special in this respect. But we
must not trespass into impossible worlds. In settings of this kind,
‘impossible worlds are only a figment of the agents’ imagination:
they serve only at epistemic alternatives. Thus, logical implication
and validity are determined solely with respect to the standard
worlds’ (Fagin et al. 1995, p. 358).
Does the semantics misrepresent logical words? A world where
p∨¬p fails, one may say, is one where it does not express the prop-
osition that either p or not-p. But this may be a problem, if at all,
only if the failure happened at possible worlds. Intuitionists claim
that instances of Excluded Middle can fail; some after Quine won-
der whether they mean something different, say, by their negation. I
doubt that the Quinean doubt is legitimate. Anyway, in the seman-
tics above Excluded Middle is valid: its failure is a way things can-
not be. A way things can be is someone conceiving failures of
Excluded Middle, as the existence of intuitionists testifies. Impossi-
ble worlds, as ‘figments of imagination’, deal with such conceivings.
3 Small technical point: the truth conditions are spelled thus for the sake of uniformity with
the other operators. But to avoid gaps or gluts at possible worlds when ® is around, one
would need to rephrase the falsity conditions; to rule out gluts, for example, one would
need w Ç−®A iff w T+A.
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Delivering Some Goods. Taken as quantifiers on possible worlds,
knowledge and belief are closed under logical consequence, that is,
with K the relevant operator:
Closure If KA and A Ñ B,4 then KB
As a special case, all valid formulae are known (believed):
Validity If Ñ A, then Ñ KA
Also, beliefs form a consistent set:
Consistency ¬(KA∧K¬A)
Rantala (1982) proposes impossible worlds frames to deal with
these ‘logical omniscience’ idealization problems. Rantala worlds,
which correspond to our extensionally impossible worlds, can be
seen as viable epistemic alternatives by imperfect or inconsistent
cognitive agents. The same goes for naive ®. By allowing such
worlds to be R-accessible, one dispenses with (the formulations with
® in place of K of) Validity, Closure and Consistency. As for Clo-
sure, for instance, in any interpretation, if @Ç+p, @Ç+p∨q, so
p Ñ p∨q. But there can be interpretations with a w∈E at which p
holds, but p∨q fails. If @Rw, then @Ç+®p, but it is not the case
that @Ç+®(p∨q). As for Consistency, just peek at contradictory
worlds where both p and ¬p are true and @Ç+®p∧®¬p.
IV
Syntactic Collapse or Weaker Closure? Why is ® naive, then? Be-
cause conceiving may demand more structure than it can afford.
When one mentally represents a scenario (say, one engages in specu-
lations on the next move of the financial markets), one accepts or
rejects some things as holding in the conceived situation, beyond
what is explicitly represented. The simple machinery above gives no
hint on how this works. As noted by Mark Jago (2007, 2009), the
lack of any restriction on accessible impossible worlds may make
the worlds apparatus pointless. W hosts worlds not closed under
4 This is shorthand for ‘{A}Ñ B’, and will be so in the following.
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arbitrary sets of formulae true at them. Then given w, take
S={w1xwRw1}, the set of worlds accessible from w. Let
C={Axw1Ç+A for all w1∈ S}, the set of formulae true at all of
them. The conceiving agent’s representational state looks like a
merely syntactic structure: w Ç+®A if and only if A∈C, and C is
just an arbitrary set of formulae. Now syntactic approaches to
knowledge/belief representation have been developed (Eberle 1974;
Moore and Hendrix 1979). But ‘one gains very little intuition about
knowledge by studying syntactic structures … in these approaches
knowledge is a primitive construct.… The semantics given to know-
ledge in Kripke structures explains knowledge as truth in all possi-
ble worlds’ (Fagin et al. 1995, p. 345). The same holds if we replace
‘knowledge’ with ‘representation’.
How about giving structure by closing ® under some weaker-
than-classical consequence? The distinction between extensionally
and intensionally impossible worlds comes into play. Rephrase the
clauses for ® as follows. For w∈P:
w Ç+®A iff for all w1∈P ∪ I such that wRw1, w1Ç+A
w Ç−®A iff for some w1∈P ∪ I such that wRw1, w1Ç−A
Now conceivability only accesses impossible scenarios of a special
kind, namely items in I, and one gets for ® Levesque’s ‘logic of im-
plicit and explicit belief’ (1984). This is basically the application of
a simple paraconsistent logic, Belnap and Dunn’s First Degree En-
tailment (fde), to belief representation. Consistency still fails for ®:
one can conceive contradictions. As expected in a paraconsistent
context, ®(A∧¬A) does not entail ®B for arbitrary B. Paraconsist-
ent logics have been advertised as logics for cognitive inconsistency
management, suitable to represent the epistemic states of non-ideal
agents. But there are reasons of dissatisfaction with the approach.
Worlds in P ∪ I correspond to situations of the world semantics for
relevant logics: these can be inconsistent and incomplete, but are al-
ways adjunctive and prime. So we have:
(1) ®A, ®B Ñ ®(A∧B)
(2) ®A Ñ ®(A∨B)
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and conceives that B, one is conceiving them together, A∧B (we will
come back to this issue below). I am not sure of (2), however. But the
main problem, as stressed by Fagin and Halpern (1988), Jago
(2007), is that logical omniscience backfires. Representation is
closed under paraconsistent consequence: ®A, and B’s being an
fde-consequence of A, automatically give ®B. Now, paraconsistent
arithmetic is well-developed non-classical mathematics, but we don’t
imagine the recondite paraconsistent consequences of its axioms.
V
Conceiving as Ceteris Paribus Activity. I still think there is some-
thing to the distinction between implicit and explicit representation,
though it should not be developed as per Levesque’s logic. Start with
the insight that what holds in a representation may exceed both
what is explicitly represented and what is entailed by mere logic.
Conceiving often rules out worlds, not by way of logic, but via fur-
ther content imported from actuality. I imagine Sherlock Holmes as
a man living in London. At @, London is in Europe, and normally a
man has lungs. Conan Doyle’s stories say nothing against this, so I
take it as holding throughout the worlds that comply with the repre-
sentation: I do imagine, if implicitly, Holmes as living in Europe and
as having lungs, although this is not entailed by the explicit content.
We want ‘It is conceived that A’ to hold at w just in case A holds at
the worlds where the explicit content obtains and some information
from w is preserved.
This brings conceiving in the vicinity of ceteris paribus condition-
als. The explicit content of a representation may play a role similar
to a conditional antecedent. Cognitive science hosts a vast literature
on ‘counterfactual imagination’ (see, for example, Byrne 2005). Peo-
ple conceive alternatives to reality by mentally erasing some of its as-
pects. Some scenarios complying with the explicit content are ruled
out because they bring gratuitous changes with respect to actuality
(or believed actuality: we will see that the difference matters).5 Stal-
5 Something similar happens in Lewis’s treatment of truth in fiction  (1978), where a non-
factive fictional operator ‘according to such-and-such a story’ works as a restricted world
quantifier. The thought is that ‘we can help ourselves to the notion of what is explicitly so
according to the fiction and use the notion of possible worlds to extend outwards and define
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ceteris paribus conditionals in terms of closeness or similarity be-
tween worlds. The conceiving we are interested in will often be
‘counterpossible’: the explicit representational contents similar to ce-
teris paribus conditional antecedents may hold at no possible world.
In the Lewis-Stalnaker approach any counterpossible conditional is
trivially true, but there are good accounts of counterpossible condi-
tionals (Read 1995; Nolan 1997; Brogaard and Salerno 2013) which
don’t make them all trivially true, precisely by resorting to impossi-
ble worlds.
World similarity is notoriously vague and context-dependent. But
Lewis argued that this is no defect of his account, which just mirrors
the vagueness of ceteris paribus conditionals themselves:
Comparative similarity is not ill-understood. It is vague … in a well-
understood way. Therefore it is just the sort of primitive that we must
use to give a correct analysis of something that is itself undeniably
vague. … I am not one of those philosophers who seek to rest fixed
distinctions upon a foundation quite incapable of supporting them. I
rather seek to rest an unfixed distinction upon a swaying foundation,
claiming that the two sway together rather than independently. (Lewis
1973, pp. 91–2)
Ceteris paribus conditionals are variably strict: as different accessi-
bility relations are determined by different formulae (or proposi-
tions), they are irreducible to combinations of standard modal and
truth-functional operators (Lewis 1973, p. 23). Correspondingly,
rather than talking of representation in the abstract, we resort to a
set K of representational acts performed on specific occasions. These
are characterized by their explicit content, to be directly expressed
by formulae, so we can just take K as a set of formulae.6 Each A∈K
determines its own accessibility, RA. Each A∈K comes with its own
operator, say [A]. So we add the square brackets to our language L,
and if A and B are formulae, ‘[A]B’ is now a formula of L.
Next, an interpretation is now a tuple 	P, I, E, @, {RxA∈K}, Ç
.
{RxA∈K} is a set of accessibilities on W, the other items are as be-
6 For certain purposes, we may want representational acts to be identified in the formalism
by the explicitly represented content and by the context where the act takes place. We will
return to this.
what is implicitly so’ (Sainsbury 2010, p. 76). The explicit fiction works in various respects
like a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent.
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w Ç+ [A]B iff for all w1∈W such that wRAw1, w1Ç+B
w Ç− [A]B iff for some w1∈W such that wRAw1, w1Ç−B
One may reformulate using set-selection functions, similarly to
Lewis (1973, pp. 57–9).7 Each A∈K comes with its own function,
fA, mapping each world w where the representing takes place to the
set of worlds the act allows access to: fA(w)={w1∈WxwRAw1}. The
two are equivalent: wRAw1 if and only if w1∈ fA(w). Let xAx be the
set of worlds where A is true. Then we get, for w∈P:
w Ç+ [A]B iff fA(w)⊆xBx
w Ç− [A]B iff fA(w)∩x¬Bx∅
[A]B is true (false) at w just in case B is true at all worlds (false at
some world) in a set determined by fA.
8 All the rest, including the
definitions of logical consequence and validity, is as before. Next,
we must address two main questions: Which constraints may one
want or not want for the various RA or fA? And how is closeness to
be understood in the presence of impossible worlds?
VI
Ceteris Paribus Invalidities. One constraint we should have is:
Obtaining If w∈P, then fA(w)⊆xAx
When w is possible, it sees via RA only worlds where the explicit
content obtains (we will come to the restriction to possible worlds
below). This gives:
Ñ [A]A
What I explicitly conceive, I conceive. A constraint one may find
plausible limits accessibility to adjunctive worlds (a point hinted at
7 Set-selection functions require what Lewis called the Limit Assumption: there can never be
endlessly closer and closer worlds to a given world. Lewis rejects it, but I believe it to be jus-
tified. What matters is similarity in relevant respects. For each world w and antecedent A,
there may well be A-worlds so close to w that any further closeness is irrelevant: see Bennett
(2003, pp. 177–80) on this.
8 To avoid gaps and gluts at w∈P we need clauses as for ® above. I skip the details.
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and w1Ç+B, then w1Ç+A∧B. This gives:
Adjunction [A]B, [A]C Ñ [A](B∧C)
If I imagine in one representation [A] that B and that C, I also imag-
ine that B∧C. This might look controversial given a popular exam-
ple by Quine, stressing the role that context and the consequent play
in counterfactuals. The imagined situation, [A], is ancient Roman
Caesar commanding troops in the Korean war. Do we imagine him
using the atomic bomb, B, or rather catapults, C? You can have
[A]B, Caesar dropping the bomb, if you hold fixed the weapons
available during the Korean war (and Caesar’s stubbornness). Or,
you have [A]C, Caesar dropping stones via catapults, if you stick to
the Roman military apparatus. You’d hardly infer that [A](B∧C),
you imagine Caesar employing both the bomb and catapults (you
can imagine that too; but it shouldn’t be an automatic entailment).
But maybe Adjunction can be maintained on the ground that [A] is
what is conceived in a single representational act, if particular acts
settle their own context.9
Invalid inferences for ceteris paribus conditionals correspond to
invalidities for our operators. These ought to be ‘non-monotonic’,
in that the following fails:
[A]B Ñ? [A∧C]B
I can imagine myself in my hometown, Venice, and I will imagine
myself in Italy. But If I imagine myself in Venice and that Venice has
been displaced in the middle of Aberdeenshire, I will not imagine
myself in Italy. Importing additional information into the explicit
content of a representational act turns it to a different one. Other in-
validities are special, and due to impossible worlds. Here’s an im-
portant one:
AtB Ñ? [A]B
That all the possible A-worlds are B-worlds does not imply that, in
a representational act whose explicit content is given by A, we auto-
matically conceive that B: we may look at impossible A-worlds
9 This may be better represented in the formalism by explicitly indexing to contexts: [A]x
and [A]y will stand for two distinct acts with the same explicit content, A, associated with
contexts x and y. Then we’ll restrict Adjunction to same-indexed operations (I leave you to
fill in the details).
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antecedent is impossible, or the consequent necessary, do not imply
the corresponding irrelevant conceivings. Although Ñ (A∧¬A)tB,
[A∧¬A]B fails. We don’t conceive any B whatsoever just by explic-
itly conceiving an inconsistency (look at an inconsistent wÇ+p∧¬p
where it is not the case that wÇ+q). Similarly, although Ñ At
(B∨¬B), we don’t have [A](B∧¬B). In general, thanks to impossi-
ble worlds, we have neither BÑ [A]B nor ¬AÑ [A]B.10
Background information in ceteris paribus representation may
comply in some respects with what Lewis (1973), after Goodman,
called ‘cotenability’. Roughly: take cotenability as the relation that,
by holding between some information and a formula, A, makes the
information eligible to be imported into the representation whose
explicit content is given by A. [A]B intuitively holds at a world
when the explicit content A, plus a ceteris paribus clause, say CA,
determined by A and cotenable with A at that world, delivers B. If I
am right about our conceiving the impossible, A can be absolutely
impossible. But once we have conceived it, cotenability marks the
familiar aspects of reality we still don’t want to ‘undo’. We hold
them constant relative to A: they make us feel at home, even if A has
us look at the strange.
However, firstly, CA is not an ordinary set of inference premisses.
As Williamson stresses in The Philosophy of Philosophy, our ‘naive
physics’—our intuitive view of causation, our expectations on ordi-
nary objects’ movements and persistence, etc.—is highly cotenable.
We cannot easily dispense with it in much of our imagination. But
naive physics is not stored in our mind as a set of premisses: clearly
identifiable, linguistically expressible principles (for details see Wil-
liamson 2007, p. 145).
Secondly, what background is imported is constrained by what is
relevant with respect to the explicit content. I know that Phnom
Penh is in Cambodia, but this is immaterial to my imagining Holm-
es’s performances as per Conan Doyle’s novels. So I need not import
the information in my imagining Holmes in action: my representa-
tion is not about that. This may have a formal counterpart in our
setting, beyond the aforementioned irrelevancies. I suspect a general
10 The restriction to possible worlds in Obtaining is there because, otherwise, if we have
nested conceivings (I conceive that I conceive that …), for any A and B we get [A]([B]B):
whatever I explicitly conceive, I conceive that what I explicitly conceive, I conceive—which
sounds bad.
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ceivability: [A]B holds only when A and B share a sentential varia-
ble, so B is at least partly about what A is about.
Thirdly, and most importantly, what is cotenable in our conceiv-
ing is not made only of truths. There may also be believed false-
hoods: ‘what people do not change when they create a counter-
factual alternative depends on their beliefs’ (Byrne 2005, p. 10). Im-
portation of false beliefs may be pervasive. As also remarked by
Williamson (2007), naive physics, despite being extremely cotena-
ble, is just false of our world. So the selected worlds are not precise-
ly the closest to how things stand (at the world where one
conceives). They must be closest to how things are believed to be
(there).11 The job of the actual world @ is to fix, not how things ac-
tually are, but the beliefs that are actually held (the more true beliefs
we hold, the smaller the difference between the two jobs).12 Then
one constraint we should not want is (the counterpart in our frame-
work of) what Lewis called Weak Centring:
Weak Centring If w∈xAx, then w∈fA(w)
If w realizes the explicit content, A, of an act of representing, then it
is one of the closest A-worlds. Even restricted to possible worlds,
Weak Centring validates this:
A, [A]B Ñ? B
If the explicit content, A, of an act obtains, and it is represented in
this act that B, then B also obtains. This will not do, for by import-
ing cotenable false beliefs we can fail to access actuality also when
the explicitly represented content is actually true. I imagine Crispin
Wright working in Aberdeen, [A], while believing that Aberdeen is
in England (may the Scots forgive me). I import the cotenable belief
and imagine that Crispin works in an English city, [A]B. A obtains:
11 This may relate our operators to (ceteris paribus) indicative conditionals, whose evalua-
tion has a strong doxastic component. Without addressing this complex issue, I notice that
various authors, such as Mares (2004, pp. 125–6), Bennett (2003, pp. 172–5), Brogaard
and Salerno (2013), believe the difference between ceteris paribus indicatives and subjunc-
tives to be smaller than supposed in much literature.
12 Similarly, one account of truth in fiction in Lewis (1978) proposes that the selected
worlds be the closest, not to how things actually are, but to how they are believed to be by
the storyteller and her intended audience. Lewis is concerned with the distinction between
shared and idiosyncratic beliefs. This is no problem for us: we work on conceiving in the
privacy of a single thinker’s mind.
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Crispin works in an English city. Our false beliefs will affect the
faithfulness to actuality of what we conceive, even when the explic-
itly conceived content is faithful. 
Finally, another constraint we don’t want is our set-selection
functions singling out a single world, that is, fA(w) being generally a
singleton. When I conceive of a situation, I normally do not repre-
sent all its details: it would be too cognitively difficult a task. I try to
foresee the developments of the financial markets: I imagine a realis-
tic situation involving brokers, displacements of real and virtual
money, and so on. I cannot imagine this in full detail, but I want the
details to be there. I would not allow the inference from the incom-
pleteness of my representation to the ‘de re’ incompleteness of the
represented objects themselves. I don’t imagine London brick by
brick; this doesn’t mean that, in my imagination, the City is a vague
object with a de re indeterminate number of bricks.
Now underspecificity is about accessing a plurality of worlds:
‘[in] imaginative experiments … we imagine only some salient fea-
tures, and thereby cover an infinite class of worlds all in one act of
imagining’ (Lewis 1986, p. 114). Different worlds fill up the unspec-
ified details in different ways. I imagine the Prime Minister signing
autographs for some City bankers. Let A express the explicit con-
tent. I have no idea whether the pm is left-handed or right-handed
(or ambidextrous). But I don’t imagine the pm as a de re underdeter-
mined object as far as his dominant hand goes. The pm is an ordi-
nary man, and normally endowed men are either left-handed or
right-handed (or ambidextrous): the worlds that realize my repre-
sentation must comply, or they won’t be close enough. So the pm is
imagined as either left-handed, L, or right-handed, R (or ambidex-
trous): for all worlds, w, such that @RAw, w Ç+L∨R. Thus,
@Ç+ [A] (L∨R). But some closest worlds don’t have the pm left-
handed, some don’t have him right-handed: we have neither
@Ç+ [A] L nor @Ç+ [A] R.
VII
Closeness, Apriority and Opacity. That our background beliefs, as
Williamson claims, ‘seem to function more like patterns of inference
than like general principles’ (2007, p. 147), suggests that we should
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conceiving:13
Calling [the relevant conceiving] ‘inferential’ is no longer very inform-
ative. … To call the new judgement ‘inferential’ simply because it is
not made independently of all the thinker’s prior beliefs or supposi-
tions is to stretch the term ‘inferential’ beyond its useful span. At any
rate, the judgement cannot be derived from the prior beliefs or suppo-
sitions purely by the application of general rules of inference. (Wil-
liamson 2007, pp. 147, 151)
Our conceiving (of this kind) is based, rather, on imaginative simu-
lation, where much work is done by fast similarity judgements. As
we represent that A, we import background beliefs via pre-reflective
adjudications on which situations are relevantly closest to how we
believe the world to be. Now, world closeness may be even more
difficult to handle when impossible worlds are around.
If we accept impossible worlds at all, some of them will be more
similar to actuality than others. The trivial world where everything
is true has to be remote from @, much more than a slightly incon-
sistent world just like @, but where some meson is both green and
anti-green. This is intuitive enough, but are there more substantial
constraints? One may accept Nolan’s Strangeness of Impossibility
Condition (sic): any possible world is closer to @ than any impossi-
ble world  (Nolan 1997, p. 550). One may also take intensionally
impossible worlds as closer than extensionally impossible ones. This
picture (inspired by Priest 2005, p. 22) has some intuitive force:
Kripke’s impossible worlds for non-normal modal logics (1965), or
the occasionally inconsistent but still adjunctive and prime worlds
of paraconsistent logic, may be less deviant than Rantala worlds.
The key aspect of closeness for a ceteris paribus account of con-
ceivability, though, has to do with apriority and opacity. This does
not show up in the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics; it was first clearly
spotted, I think, in Brogaard and Salerno’s account of counterpossi-
ble conditionals (2013) (but see also Jago 2009). One may imagine
Hesperus as not being Phosphorus, or water as failing to be h2o.
Take [water  h2o]. The Obtaining constraint gives:
13 This does not rule out different kinds of conceiving where logical inferences play a key
role. One clever approach to this is in Jago (2007, 2009), where some impossible worlds are
accessed, others are ruled out, via the step-by-step application of rules of inference to the
represented content.
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However, we may want this to fail:
(2) [water  h2o] water  water
I make no commitment on our capacity of conceiving something as
plainly different from itself; but conceiving that water or Phospho-
rus are not self-identical should not follow by sheer logic from con-
ceiving that water  h2o, or that Hesperus  Phosphorus. The
ancients took Hesperus as distinct from Phosphorus, but had no
doubts on Phosphorus’s self-identity. When we ‘imaginatively devel-
op’ our conceiving that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, or that water is
not h2o, ‘we are committed to the explicit denial of no logical
truth’ (Williamson 2007, p. 174). Williamson takes the failure of
the entailment between (the counterfactual counterparts of) (1) and
(2) as undermining the non-trivial treatment of counterpossibles: the
view requires counterfactuals to create opaque contexts (and this is
too bad). Brogaard and Salerno accept that this is indeed the case
(and claim that it’s not bad).14 But even if Williamson is right that
substitutivity should hold in counterfactual contexts because these
are not about intentional features, this is certainly not so for our
conceivability operators. They model intentional phenomena: their
hyperintensionality is no surprise.
Now this says something about world closeness. In order for (2)
to fail, we need closest impossible worlds where water is not h2o—
say, it is xyz—but water is self-identical. Even while conceiving
water as not being h2o, the self-identity of water is an a priori truth
to be retained. Appeal to apriority explains the failure of substitutiv-
ity, for ‘It is a priori that’ creates opaque contexts: we cannot get
from ‘It is a priori that water=water’ to ‘It is a priori that water=
h2o’. Impossible worlds’ closeness should be ‘partially epistemic’
(Brogaard and Salerno 2013, p. 654) and take apriority on board. I
agree, at least for ceteris paribus conceivability.
Brogaard and Salerno follow two-dimensionalism à la Chalmers
in taking apriority as context-dependent, but unlike what happens
in, for example, Chalmers (2001), they don’t stipulate that all math-
14 That substitutivity works in most counterfactual contexts may be explained by closeness
(and our usually focusing on possible antecedents), given the sic: when a counterfactual
antecedent is possible, impossible worlds will be too far away. Substitutivity may fail only if
impossible worlds are accessed.
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jects. They call their notion ‘a priori*’ to mark the difference (a
similar picture of a ‘non-ideal epistemic space’, in fact, is already in
Jago 2009). Then they propose the following heuristics. Given im-
possible worlds w1 and w2, w1 is closer than w2 when:
(a) w1 does not contain a greater number of sentences formally incon-
sistent with the relevant background facts (held fixed in the context)
than w2 does. And if w1 and w2 contain the same number of sentences
formally inconsistent with the relevant background facts (held fixed in
the context):
(b) w1 preserves a greater number of a priori* implications between
sentences than w2 does.
(Brogaard and Salerno 2013, p. 655)
I suggest a similar view for our purposes, with two provisos. First,
we should replace ‘background facts’ with ‘background beliefs’: the
cotenable background of our conceiving can host false beliefs. Sec-
ond, while spelling out points (a) and (b) separately can be useful,
many a priori* implications and statements are but more cotenable
claims—the more so the more obvious they are. Closeness is not
only about preserving a greater number of items, but also about re-
taining what is more obvious: the more evident the a priori* state-
ments violated in an impossible world are, the more far-fetched it is,
all things considered. What is obvious, of course, varies with con-
text and speaker, as does the relevant similarity. But in particular,
‘h2o is h2o [or “water is water”] is a priori* for all minimally ra-
tional speakers’ (Brogaard and Salerno 2013, p. 656): it’s self-evi-
dent a priori background we just tend not to give up, while ‘water is
h2o’ is not a priori. This is how, bracketing the issue whether we
can conceive something as plainly non-self-identical, impossible
worlds where water is not h2o but is self-identical can be closer
than worlds where water is neither h2o nor self-identical.
15
15 This work has been developed within the 2013–15 ahrc project The Metaphysical Basis
of Logic: The Law of Non-contradiction as Basic Knowledge (grant ref. ah/k001698/1). A
version of the paper was presented in September 2013 at the Modal Metaphysics Workshop
in Bratislava. I am grateful to the audiences there and at the Aristotelian Society meeting for
many helpful comments and remarks.
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